Summary: Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that rms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game rms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly we brie y discuss comparative statics results.
Introduction
It seems a commonplace that information is valuable. Good information facilitates good decisions. Since information can be ignored it seems obvious that the value of information must be positive. While this reasoning is valid in a one-person decision problem, it is not in the context of multi-person decision problems. Akerlof's (1970) seminal paper on the market for lemons has shown that information may hurt. A seller who has private information about the quality of his second-hand car may be unable to nd a buyer, because buyers will believe that only bad quality cars will be sold. In this case information seems to have negative value. However, it is not the information about the car itself that hurts the seller, it is the fact that buyers know that sellers are privately informed and react accordingly by not buying. Hence, the information of the buyers about the informedness of the sellers is doing the damage. We propose to distinguish between the informational value and the strategic value of information. The informational value should be interpreted as the direct gain obtained from taking a better decision due to superior information, taking the decisions of all other agents as given. The strategic value refers to the indirect gain (or loss) caused by the reaction of other agents to the presence of private information. As suggested by the terminology the informational value is always positive, while the strategic value can either be positive or negative. The lemons market is a clear example where the strategic value of information is negative and even outweighs the informational value.
In Akerlof's story private information is exogenously given. In other situations agents can decide whether or not to acquire information. One could think of several scenarios: (i) rms engage in market research to estimate demand; (ii) stock brokers read nancial reports of rms; (iii) bidders in auctions go to viewing days in order to get some idea of the value of the items on sale; (iv) potential entrants investigate the pro tability of new markets. With endogenous information acquisition agents will have to trade o the cost of information against its bene t. Should an agent include the strategic value of information in this trade-o , or should he only take into account the informational value? He should include the strategic value only if the decision to get information a ects the behavior of the other agents. This is only the case when the other agents observe the information acquisition decision. If, on the other hand, the other agents do not observe this decision, then his decision cannot a ect their behavior, and, therefore, he should ignore the strategic value of information.
In the existing literature endogenous information acquisition has mostly been modeled by adding a stage before the \true" game (Cournot competition, investment game, bidding, entry game) is played. This modeling technique implies that the information acquisition decisions are perfectly observable and become common knowledge. In our opinion, this observability assumption is rather strong: at least in some circumstances it is not clear how a rm would be able to perfectly observe the information acquisition decisions of its competitors. Disregarding espionage 1 , one possibility is that all rms publicly announce their information acquisition decisions. However, why should they announce the truth? If the strategic value of information is positive a rm will want to exaggerate its informedness while it would like to hide its informedness if it has negative strategic value. The structure of the widely used two-stage game implicitly assumes that rms will tell the truth. It seems, therefore, that the two-stage game is not always the most appropriate way to model information acquisition. We suggest to use a one-stage game where information is gathered secretly. Given that in such a game the information acquisition decision is not observable, it cannot a ect the behavior of other agents. Hence, unlike in the two-stage game, the trade-o between the cost and the bene t of information does not include the strategic value of information.
In this paper we compare the two-stage and one-stage game of information acquisition in the context of a Cournot market with stochastic demand. The two-stage game has been extensively studied by Chang and Lee (1992) , Daughety and Reinganum (1994) , Hwang (1993 Hwang ( , 1995 , Li et al. (1987) , Ockenfels (1989) , Ponssard (1979) and Vives (1988) . To our knowledge this paper is the rst to consider secret information acquisition in Cournot markets. 2 We show that in the two-stage game rms acquire more information than in the one-stage game. This means that the strategic value of information is positive in this context. The underlying intuition is as follows: rms gather information because they want to estimate residual demand. Raising the precision of information has two direct bene ts, which are present in both models of information acquisition. It reduces the prediction errors of the intercept of demand and of the signals received by the competitors. Hence, both the demand curve and the production levels of the competitors can be estimated more accurately. This is the informational value of information. In the two-stage model there is the additional strategic value. If one rm raises its precision of information (in the rst stage) other rms will react less aggressively to their own signal (in the second stage). This implies that the competitors' quantities will be predicted more precisely.
To illustrate this point, consider a Cournot duopoly model similar to Ponssard's (1979) where information is either learned perfectly or not at all at cost c and demand d is either high (h) or low (d) with equal probility, i.e. average demand is a = (h + l)=2.
The price is p = d ? q, where q is the aggregate production. Consider the situation in which one rm is informed and the other rm is uninformed. We will show that for some information costs this is an equilibrium outcome in the one-stage game but not in the two-stage game. In this situation the uninformed rm produces a=3 (making pro ts Hwang (1995) stated that it would be desirable to analyse the one-stage game, while Ponssard (1979) mistakenly claimed that it did not matter. Hurkens and Vulkan (1996) considered secret information acquisition in an entry game, while Matthews (1984) and Persico (1997) studied secret information acquisition in auctions. rm would deviate in the two-stage game, but not in the one-stage game.
The extra information gathering in the two-stage game is due to the positive strategic value of being known to be informed. Nevertheless, the positive strategic value does not imply higher payo s in the two-stage game than in the one-stage game. The additional bene t of information acquisition enjoyed by a rm in the two-stage game induces it to acquire more information which imposes a negative externality on other rms and lowers their pro ts. In fact, as will be shown in section 3, equilibrium payo s of the two-stage game are strictly lower than those of the one-stage game.
This provides an argument why rms would not like to play the two-stage game even if they could choose to do so. To illustrate this point, suppose it were possible for rms to credibly announce their level of information acquisition. 3 Because of the positive strategic value they would acquire more information and announce it. This would lead to the two-stage game outcome. The precision announcement game is a type of prisoner's dilemma: each rm prefers to gather more information and announce it, but when all rms do that, they are all worse o . In a repeated game framework the Pareto dominant equilibrium of no-announcement corresponding to the one-stage game payo s can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Given the higher equilibrium payo s of the one-stage game rms will consciously choose not to reveal the precision of their information.
Information acquisition does not only a ect rms' pro ts, it is also important for social welfare, because it allows demand and supply to be matched better. On the other hand, too much duplication of costly research is socially undesirable. A government may want to implement the socially e cient level of market research. However, policy measures based on the two-stage game will be biased in the direction of lower subsidies or higher taxes, compared to policy based on the (in our view) more appropriate one-stage model. In fact, we show that even the direction of policy can be overturned: For a certain range of parameters the one-stage game will advocate subsidies while the two-stage game will support taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our general model in which rms can choose their information acquisition from a continuum and where rms may have di erent cost functions. We present our main result that rms acquire less information when information acquisition is not observed. Section 3 analyzes the special case of homogeneous oligopoly and reconsiders the models of Vives (1988) and Li et al. (1987) . We derive the explicit expression for the equilibrium amount of information gathering. It is shown that equilibrium payo s in the one-stage game are strictly higher than in the two-stage game. We reinforce Vives'(1988) result, that competitive markets, seen as the limit of nite Cournot markets when the number of rms goes to in nity, are second best e cient. In nite oligopolistic markets, however, rms may over-or underinvest in information acquisition. Conditions are stated under which rms underinvest relative to the social optimum. Finally, it is shown that policy implications derived from the di erent models of information acquisition may give qualitatively di erent results. In section 4 we brie y discuss the special case of heterogeneous duopoly. Section 5 concludes and discusses some of the other models of information acquisition that have employed a two-stage model.
The Model
We will set up a general model of information acquisition in Cournot markets such that the models of Vives (1988) , Li et al. (1987) (symmetric rms) and Hwang (1993) (asymmetric duopoly) can be considered as special cases.
There are n 2 rms. The inverse demand function is given by p = ? n P n j=1 x j , where x j is the output of rm j, n > 0 is a constant and is a random parameter with mean and variance 2 . Firm i has a cost function C i (x i ) = c i x i + i x 2 i , where c i 0, i 0. Each rm i can buy information of certain precision 1=v i about demand. This means that rm i will receive a signal s i = +" i where " i is a noise term with zero mean, variance v i and with Cov( ; " i ) = 0. The signals received by the rms are independent conditional on and furthermore it is assumed that E( j s i ) is a ne in s i . These assumptions imply that E( j s i ) = E(s j j s i ) = + t i (s i ? ), where t i = 2 =( 2 + v i ).
Note that as v i ranges from 0 to in nity, t i ranges from 1 to 0. Instead of working with v i , we shall work with t i and refer to t i as the precision of information. We assume that the cost of information acquisition is linear in 1=v i , or equivalently, information of precision t i costs
A typical example of such an a ne information structure is for and " i to be Normal. s i could be the average of n i observations from a Normal distribution with mean and xed variance. The precision of information 1=v i is proportional to the number of observations. When the marginal cost of an extra observation c is constant, the cost of information will be linear in 1=v i . (See Vives (1988) for a description of a number of other distributions that de ne an a ne information structure.)
Let ? 1 denote the one-stage game of information acquisition. A strategy for rm i in this game is a pair (t i ; x i ( )), where t i 2 0; 1) is the choice of precision and where x i ( ) maps private signals into quantities. Let ? 2 denote the two-stage game. In this game a strategy for rm i is a pair (t i ; y i ( ; )), where t i again denotes the precision of information and where y i (t; s i ) denotes the quantity produced by i in case it receives signal s i while rms have chosen to acquire information according to the tuple t = (t 1 ; ; t n ). Let ? 2 (t) denote the second stage continuation game of ? 2 where precision tuple t was chosen in the rst stage. It is quite straightforward to solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of ? 2 . First one solves for the (unique) Bayesian Nash equilibrium of ? 2 (t), for all t. Substitution of the equilibrium payo s i (t) ? C(t i ) reduces the two-stage game to a game where only precision levels have to be chosen. This gives rise to reaction functions, and the equilibrium level of information is found by computing the intersection of these reaction functions, or, if the solution is interior, by equating the marginal value of information with its marginal cost:
At rst sight it seems that solving ? 1 will be more complicated. The precision of information t i and the action function x i ( ) have to be chosen simultaneously. Hence, it is not possible to work with reaction functions. However, a rst order condition approach can be used. In fact, it will turn out that this is easier for the one-stage game than for the two-stage game. In particular, an explicit solution for ? 1 will be derived whereas the solution for ? 2 can be given only implicitly. The key observation is that if (t; x) is a pure Nash equilibrium of ? 1 , it must be the case that x is an equilibrium of ? 2 (t). This reduces the number of candidate solutions of ? 1 considerably. Only these candidate solutions have to be checked against unilateral deviations (t 0 i ; x 0 i ). The Continuation Game As outlined above, the rst step in the analysis of both ? 1 and ? 2 , focuses on the continuation games ? 2 (t). From the previous literature it is known that the equilibrium strategies in each continuation game are a ne with respect to the signal. Instead of proving this here, we will impose that all quantity choice functions are a ne.
Let t = (t 1 ; ; t n ) be a tuple of information precisions and consider the continuation game ? 2 (t). Fix strategies x j (s j ) = a j (s j ? ) + b j for all j 6 = i. The best reply for rm i is that function x i ( ) that maximizes conditional expected pro t
Hence, 
The conditional expected payo (gross of information cost) from responding in this optimal way equals ( i + n )(x i (s i )) 2 . In the appendix the unconditional expected pro t is computed to be
Lemma 
It is not so easily veri ed that the second order condition is satis ed, but it can be done. (Vives (1988) showed it for homogeneous rms. His proof is straightforwardly extended to heterogeneous rms.) Consider now the one-stage game. In order for ( t; x( )) to be a pure equilibrium of ? 1 , x( ) needs to be the equilibrium of ? 2 ( t). As before, this strategy pro le can be computed and written as x i (s i ) = b e i + a e i t ] t i (s i ? ). The additional condition is that no rm must have an incentive to deviate from this pro le. Note that rms can deviate from the information precision and the quantity decision function at the same time. However, given a deviation from t i to t i , the optimal deviation from x i ( ) is easily seen to be x i (s i ) = b e i + a e i t ]t i (s i ? ). This follows from (1) and (2). (Recall that the opponents do not observe the deviation and stick therefore to their strategies.) Note that a e i t ] depends on t, but not on t i . Assuming an interior solution it follows from (3) that this amounts to demanding that
Here it is easily veri ed that the second order condition is satis ed, since C 00 (t i ) > 0 and the left-hand side does not depend on t i .
Comparing (4) and (5) it becomes obvious that the solutions of the two di erent information acquisition games do not coincide, as long as they are interior. In fact, whenever @ a e i t]=@t i > 0 the solution of the two-stage game will yield higher levels of precision than the one-stage game. It follows immediately from Lemma 1 that indeed @ a e i t]=@t i > 0. This establishes our main result:
Theorem 2 The equilibrium precisions of information in ? 1 are strictly smaller than those in ? 2 , unless they are zero in both.
The theorem says that rms choose more information in the two-stage game because the marginal value is higher in that case. Each rm i realizes that if it increases its level of information the other rms j 6 = i will use their information less (since @ a j =@t i < 0 by Lemma 1). This makes the behavior of others easier to predict and rm i's payo increases. However, since in equilibrium every rm acquires more information, it is not clear whether equilibrium payo s of the two-stage game are higher than those of the onestage game. In fact, we will show in the next section that in the case of homogeneous rms the equilibrium payo s of the two-stage game are strictly lower. By continuity this result continues to hold when rms' production costs are not too far apart.
Homogeneous Firms
In this section the special case of homogeneous rms will be considered. Let i and c i 0 for all i. 4 Lett denote a tuple of information precisions wheret j t for all j 6 = i.
Consider the equilibrium x( ) of ? 2 (t (8) Substitution of (7) and (8) into (4) and some further manipulations yield that the symmetric equilibrium precision of information t is found by solving MP V 2 (t ) = C 0 (t ), where MP V 2 (t) = 2 ( + n ) 2( + n )(1 + (n ? 1) ) + (n ? 1) t n (2( + n )(1 + (n ? 1) ) ? (n ? 1) t n ) 3 ; if this solution is nonnegative. In this expression
We use the notation MP V 2 (t) to denote the marginal private value to a rm of increasing its precision when all rms have acquired information of precision t. It is impossible to get an explicit solution for t . Only the limit solution for the case of in nitely many rms can be computed after taking the limit of MP V 2 as n goes to in nity. This limit case will be of interest in order to compare our results with Vives (1988) and Li et al. (1987) who focused on this case.
Consider now the one-stage model. Substitution of (7) into (5) yields that the symmetric equilibrium precision of information t is found by solving MP V 1 ( t) = C 0 ( t), where 
The di erence is proportional to (and of the same sign as) @ a i =@t i . (Compare (4) and (5).) Hence, t > t, unless t = t = 0.
Note, however, that when n tends to in nity MP V 2 ( ) and MP V 1 ( ) converge to the same function. Therefore, in the limit the di erence between the outcomes of the two di erent information acquisition games disappears. This is independent of whether the market is replicated a la Vives (1988) or a la Li et al. (1987) . In the model of Li et al. (1987) this result is not surprising at all. Since in their model n = is independent of n, demand is not replicated when the number of rms grows. When n goes to in nity, the gross pro ts per rm go to zero. Therefore, the amount of money spent on research has to go to zero as well. In the model of Vives (1988) where demand is replicated since n = =n the result is not that obvious. In this case private information acquisition information has an additional bene t. If one rm raises its precision of information other rms will react less aggressively to their own signal. Therefore competitors' quantities will be predicted more precisely. This implies that in each nite Cournot market rms' quantity decisions can be manipulated by one single rm changing its information acquisition. When the number of rms grows, the in uence per opponent diminishes. However, it is not obvious that the aggregate of these small in uences is not substantial.
Note also that MP V 2 (0) = MP V 1 (0) and that MP V 0 2 (0) = MP V 0 1 (0). This implies that when the equilibrium amounts of information acquisition are close to zero (because information gathering is very costly or because initial uncertainty is quite small), then the two models predict approximately the same levels of information acquisition. For low information cost and high initial uncertainty the models will, however, predict very di erent levels of information gathering.
Since rms acquire di erent levels of information in the two games, their payo s will also di er. We obtain:
Lemma 3 The equilibrium payo s of ? 2 are strictly lower than those of ? 1 , unless no information is gathered in any of the games.
Proof. See Appendix. Welfare Firms gather information in order to estimate residual demand and make higher pro ts. Consumers also bene t from the fact that demand and supply are matched better. When rms receive imprecise signals, some rms will overestimate demand while others will underestimate it. As a result rms will produce di erent quantities and, since production costs are convex, they will produce at di erent marginal costs, which clearly indicates an ine ciency. Better information reduces this ine ciency. On the other hand, a rm gathering information imposes a negative externality on its rivals. It raises its pro ts at the expense of the other rms. (Cf. Lemma 2.) At high levels of information acquisition this lowers total industry pro t. The duplication of market research by many rms also has a negative e ect on social welfare. The welfare aspects of information acquisition are therefore not clear and need to be examined. We need to de ne the e cient level of information and examine which policy measures are needed in order to obtain this optimal level. Since rms acquire more information in the two-stage game than in the one-stage game, policy implications are likely to di er with the model we use. Moreover, if our claim that the one-stage game is more appropriate is true, it is important to understand how wrong policies based on the two-stage game would be. Will policy implications be reversed, i.e. will the two-stage model recommend to tax (subsidize) information acquisition when it ought to be subsidized (taxed)? Or will it advocate a di erent magnitude of the same policy direction?
To address this issue three di erent de nitions for the best (e cient) level of information will be examined that are characterized by a trade-o between e ciency and feasibility.
De nition 1 The rst best (e cient) level of information is that level of information acquisition that maximizes welfare when rms use welfare maximizing quantities in production and the information of all rms can be pooled. Vives (1988) has shown that (with strictly convex cost functions) the competitive market cannot attain the rst best level of information, unless the cost of information is zero. There are simply no strategies that could yield the rst best outcome, since convex costs imply that rms will surely operate at di erent marginal costs if they are to rely on their own private signal. With constant marginal cost, however, rst best e ciency is possible. This result is opposed to the one of Li et al. (1987) . The di erence of results is caused by the fact that Li et al. (1987) do not replicate the market appropriately. Therefore, from now on we will only consider the properly replicated market, that is n = =n. The assumption that the information of all rms can be pooled does not respect the decentralized decision structure of the economy. E ciency of competitive markets is restored if the constraint of decentralized information acquisition is recognized.
De nition 2 The second best (e cient) level of information is that level of information acquisition that maximizes welfare when rms use welfare maximizing quantity functions in production while information cannot be pooled. Vives (1988) has shown that the competitive market attains this second best level. Since in the limit case rms acquire the same amount of information in the one-stage game of information acquisition as in the two-stage game, we get the following corollary to Vives' result: Corollary 4 When the number of rms goes to in nity, the one-stage game model of information acquisition yields the second best e cient level of information. The second best e cient level of welfare is problematic because it is based on rms maximizing welfare in production. It thereby implicitly assumes either a policy measure in the form of subsidizing production that induces rms to do so, or perfect competition. A subsidy on production is hard to implement since the size of the correct subsidy depends on the pool of information. The alternative implicit assumption of perfect competition makes the criterion inapplicable to nite oligopolistic markets. In perfectly competitive markets the second best e cient level of information coincides with the following criterion:
De nition 3 The third best (e cient) level of information is that level of information acquisition that maximizes welfare when rms use pro t maximizing quantity functions in their production decision and information cannot be pooled.
Given that the third best e cient level of information respects the market structure in both information acquisition and production it seems the appropriate criterion to be used for policy recommendations. The rst best level is irrelevant since rms have no incentives to pool their information. (See Gal-Or (1985) .) Moreover, like the second best level it assumes some policy measure that ensures welfare maximization in production. Only the third measure concentrates on the pure e ects of information acquisition and will therefore be the basis for our welfare analysis.
For given precision of information t for each rm, each rm j will use the equilibrium strategy x j (s j ) = a(s j ? ) + b where a and b are determined by equations (6) and (7) We can compute the expected total welfare, ET W (t) by rst taking the expectation over signals conditional on , and then taking the expectation over . The third best e cient level t e3 satis es ET W 0 (t e3 ) = nC 0 (t e3 ), or equivalently, MSV (t e3 ) = C 0 (t e3 ); where MSV (t) = ET W 0 (t)=n denotes the per capita marginal social value of information. This is equal to the marginal e ect on total welfare when one rm increases its precision, when all rms have precision t. In the appendix we show that MSV (t) = 2 2 2 + 3 2 n + 5 n + (n ? 1)t n + (n ? 1)t 2 n =2 (2( + n ) + (n ? 1)t n ) 3 : (10) We are now ready to compare the e cient level with the equilibrium level of information acquisition. Recall that at the equilibrium marginal private value equals marginal cost, while at the third best e cient level of information, the (per capita) marginal social value equals marginal cost. Whether under-or overinvestment takes place depends therefore on the relative positions of the curves C 0 , MSV , and MP V 1 (for the one-stage game) and MP V 2 (for the two-stage game). We already know that MP V 1 lies below MP V 2 from Theorem 2. The following lemma shows how the relative positions of the other curves exactly depend on the parameters of the model. (ii) MSV (t) > MP V 2 (t) if and only if t <t 2 , wheret 2 is the positive root of (n ? 1)(2n = + 3=2)]t 2 + n(n = + 1)]t ? 2(n = + 1) 2 = 0: t 2 < 1 if and only (4( = ) 2 ? 6 = )n 2 + (12 = ? 5)n + 7 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Lemma 5 tells us that the MSV and MPV curve intersect in a pointt which depends on = and n. For t <t, MSV (t) > MP V (t) and for t >t the reverse holds. The reason is as follows. At low levels of information acquisition some rms under-and others overestimate demand considerably. This means that they will choose very di erent production levels, and since costs are convex, they will produce at di erent marginal costs, which indicates an ine ciency. (The ine ciency increases with = .) Moreover, at low levels of information precision the negative externality that rms in ict on each other is smaller than at high levels. The marginal social value at low (high) levels of t is therefore relatively high (low) compared to the marginal private value.
Note thatt 1 1 when = 1=2 and thatt 2 1 when = 3=2. Hence, when the ine ciency caused by rms producing at di erent marginal costs is high, the marginal social value is larger than the marginal private value, and as a consequence rms underinvest. This is true, whatever the size of the market, the cost of information gathering and the initial uncertainty. In this case subsidies on information acquisition activities could improve welfare. Note that the one-stage game model advocates higher subsidies than the two-stage model.
When the ine ciency caused by rms producing at di erent marginal costs is not severe ( = is low), then for su ciently large markets the intersection point of the marginal social value curve and the marginal private value curve lies within the interval (0; 1). Whether rms over-or underinvest now depends on the initial uncertainty and the cost of information acquisition. To be precise, it depends on the ratio 4 =c. (See Lemma 6 in the Appendix.) Fig. 1 illustrates the three possible cases.
When information is cheap and initial uncertainty relatively large (see curve C 0 3 in Fig.  1 ), rms will overinvest. Taxes on information acquisition activities could restore this.
(Note that the one-stage game calls for lower taxes than the two-stage model.) When information is expensive and initial uncertainty small (curve C 0 1 ), rms will underinvest relative to the optimum: subsidies are in order. (The one-stage game model calls for higher subsidies than the two-stage model.) Note that for intermediate values of the ratio c= 4 the one-stage game predicts underinvestment and calls for subsidies, while the two-stage game model predicts overinvestment and advocates taxes. (Curve C 0 2 .) Put Figure 1 here]
Note that 2 appears both in MSV (t) and in MP V (t) as a factor. Higher initial uncertainty ampli es the di erence between the social and the private value, while it lowers and attens C 0 (t). This means that for high initial uncertainty overinvestment will occur and that the introduction of the right tax could make up for a substantial welfare improvement. In this case the two di erent models of information acquisition would advocate very di erent tax levels and it is therefore important to use the relevant model. When initial uncertainty is very small, on the other hand, a small subsidy would be needed. The welfare improvement would not be very substantial in this case, and also the two di erent models of information acquisition would not yield very di erent policy recommendations.
The above results show how the di erent parameters determine whether over-or underinvestment occurs. They also show that the two-stage model either advocates too low subsidies, too high taxes or a tax instead of a subsidy. In some circumstances the degree of over-or underinvestment is very small, in which case it does not really matter which model of information acquisition is used. This happens when ! 0, 2 ! 0 or n ! 1. For ! 1, ! 1 or c ! 1 it is optimal not to acquire information and no policy measure is needed. In all other cases introducing the right policy measure can account for a substantial welfare improvement. In those cases it is important to use the right model, especially when initial uncertainty is large.
Heterogeneous Duopoly
For the case of heterogeneous duopoly ( 1 > 2 ) the model of section 2 reduces to the model of Hwang (1993) . Hwang (1993) analyzed the two-stage game and performed comparative statics exercises in order to analyze how the parameters of the model a ect the equilibrium precisions of information. In this section we brie y compare Hwang's results with the ones that can be obtained for the one-stage model. For details we refer the reader to our working paper Hauk and Hurkens (1997) .
Let us rst remark that in the two-stage model one cannot give explicit expressions for the equilibrium precisions of information as the relevant equations are of high order. Comparative statics exercises must be done by investigating how the reaction curves shift when some parameter changes. In the case of the one-stage game we can explicitly calculate the equilibrium precisions of information (as the relevant equations turn out to be quadratic), which makes the comparative statics exercises easier as well.
It turns out that all qualitative comparative statics results for the two-stage game hold true for the one-stage game. That is, (i) rm 1 (the rm with the steeper marginal cost curve) acquires less information than rm 2; (ii) a decrease of information cost or an increase in initial uncertainty implies that both rms will increase their precision of information, but rm 1 will increase its precision more than rm 2; (iii) when the slope of the marginal cost curve for one rm increases, this rm will decrease its precision while its rival will increase precision; (iv) a steepening of the demand curve leads rm 2 to acquire less information, while the e ect for rm 1 is ambiguous. 5
Conclusions
In situations of endogenous information acquisition agents trade o the bene ts from having better information against the cost of acquiring information. This paper argued that the bene ts depend on whether information is acquired privately or secretly. Under private information acquisition (two-stage game) the information acquisition decisions of agents become common knowledge and have therefore a strategic value. By acquiring more information an agent can manipulate the reactions of its opponents. Under secret information acquisition (one-stage game) this is impossible, since opponents will not observe how well informed their rivals are. This latter case seems to be the more appropriate set-up, given that agents have no incentives to reveal their level of informedness truthfully. We illustrated these ideas in an oligopolistic market with uncertain demand. It was shown that the strategic value of information is positive in this context. If one rm is known to have good information, other rms will act less aggressively towards their own private information and this makes their behavior easier to predict. In the two-stage model rms therefore overinvest in market research relative to the case of secret information acquisition. It was shown, that this overinvestment vanishes when the number of rms becomes very large. This implies that in a competitive market the second (and third) best e cient level of information is acquired. In smaller markets rms may under-or overinvest with respect to the e cient level of information acquisition. Policy implications depend always quantitatively on which model of information acquisition is considered. In some instances the policies advocated by the two models are even qualitatively di erent (tax versus subsidy). Using the appropriate model is therefore important.
In this paper it was argued that the one-stage game is the more relevant model since rms are not able to observe the information acquisition decisions of their opponents. The two-stage game would be appropriate if rms could credibly commit to (a lower bound on) the precision of information and would deliberately choose to do so. However, Lemma 3 showed that rms are better o not announcing the precision of their information. This paper reconsidered the models of Ponssard (1979), Li et al. (1987) , Vives (1988) and Hwang (1993) in detail. There are some other models of information acquisition that have not been discussed yet. Ockenfels (1989) considers a model very similar to the one of Ponssard (1979) . The only di erence is that in Ockenfels' model quantity choices are discrete (in fact binary). It is clear that his model exhibits the same problem as Ponssard (1979) . Chang and Lee (1992) discuss a model of quantity competition in a di erentiated duopoly which did not t nicely in the model presented in section 2, although the present model could be extended to include di erentiated products as well. Again information acquisition is modeled as a two-stage game. It can be easily veri ed by computing the best reply against an a ne strategy, as was done in section 2, that also in their model rms overinvest in research relative to the case of secret information acquisition. The same is true for price competition with di erentiated products. In this case, however, the information acquisition stage is of the strategic complements variety (see Chapter 8 in Vives (2000) ). This, coupled with the fact that in the Bertrand game the strategic value of information is positive and that a rm likes its rivals to be informed (see section 8.3.1 in Vives (2000)), means that rms' pro ts will be higher in the two-stage game than in the one-stage game. 6 The externality of information acquisition is thus positive. Hwang (1995) considers a model of information acquisition that is designed to compare monopoly, duopoly, and competitive markets. There are only two players in the model. The second stage game is modeled using conjectural variations. By varying the conjectural variations the model can represent monopoly, duopoly or a competitive market. However, in the rst stage there are no conjectural variations. Hence, the in uence of raising the precision of information are more or less the same as in the ordinary duopoly game. This means that rms overinvest in research in Hwang's (1995) model even in the case of a competitive market. The peculiarity of this model is further illustrated by Lemma 4 in Hwang (1995) . It says that the level of information precision that maximizes joint pro t is smaller than the equilibrium precision. The Lemma is mathematically correct, but does not make any sense in the case the model is to represent a monopoly.
Further models of information acquisition have been studied for auctions. Milgrom (1981) considers a two-stage version whereas Matthews (1984) considers the one-stage version. Unfortunately Matthews (1984) was unable to get an explicit solution. Persico (2000) compares secret information acquisition in a rst-and second-price auction. Further research has to be conducted for the case of auctions. One should note, though, that the main interest in the literature on information acquisition in auctions is when the number of bidders becomes very large. The question addressed is whether the winning bid will converge (with probability one) to the true value of the object. Because of the similarity with competitive markets one might conjecture that it does not matter whether information is acquired secretly or not. However, this needs to be examined carefully.
Appendix

Existence of equilibrium
The unconditional expected pro t is 6 We thank the referee for pointing this out. (i = 1; : : : ; n)
Note that the constants b e i (i = 1; ; n) do not depend on the precision of information in the market.
To nd the solution to (11) we rst subtract n b e i from both sides: (2 i + n )b Substituting (14) into (13) gives the result.
The solution of (12) is obtained in a similar way: now n t i a e i t] is subtracted in the rst step. Recall that t (resp. t ) denotes the equilibrium level of information acquisition in the one-stage game (resp. two-stage game), and that t < t . Let a e t] = 1=(2( + n ) + (n ? 1)t n ) and b e = =(2 + (n + 1) n ), such that x(s) = b e + a e t]t(s ? ) is the equilibrium strategy of each rm in the second stage game ?(t; :::; t). Using (3) we know that the equilibrium payo in this second stage game equals (t) = ( + n )((b e ) 2 + ( a e t]) 2 t 2 :
The equilibrium payo s for the one-and two-stage game are therefore ( t) ? C( t) and (t ) ? C(t ). Now 0 (t) ? C 0 (t) = 2 ( + n ) 2( + n ) ? (n ? 1) n t (2( + n ) + (n ? 1) n t) 3 ? C 0 (t) < MP V 1 (t) ? C 0 (t) (15) where MP V 1 (t) is the marginal private value of information acquisition in the onestage game de ned by (9). The right-hand side of (15) is negative for t > t. Hence, ( t) ? C( t) > (t ) ? C(t ). Taking the expectation over gives unconditional expected welfare The right-hand side depends only on n, , and . Call it x 1 . Now overinvestment occurs if and only if 4 =c > x 1 . The proof of (ii) goes along the same lines. -6
